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Abstract 
The relationship between large enterprises (LEs) and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
in Japan has undergone major changes during the long-term recession since 1991. While 
SMEs still play the important role of supplying parts and components to LEs through 
subcontracting, many LEs have started to reduce the number of their suppliers and the 
components they use in manufacturing. While efficient SMEs selected by LEs were able to 
expand their businesses, inefficient SMEs lost customers. The regression results in this 
study suggest that the decrease in number of establishments—specifically, the exit of 
inefficient SMEs—might improve total factor productivity growth rates. The traditional 
business model of being dependent on certain LEs and doing business within the cluster is 
not functioning as well as it used to. Heavy dependence on certain industries and highly 
segmented and specialized production processes prevent the clusters from adjusting to the 
new business environment. Some SMEs are still able to create new business by taking 
advantage of more flexible divisions of labor. SME policies must encourage diversification 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have long played an important role in supplying parts 
and components to large enterprises (LEs) in Japan through subcontracting. However, the 
relationship between LEs and SMEs has changed under the long-term recession since 1991. 
The streamlining of procurement by the LEs led to the selection of only the efficient 
subcontractors. While efficient SMEs can get more orders and can invest to improve their 
capacity, the inefficient ones lost business opportunities. During the long-term recession, the 
so-called “three excesses”—excess debt, excess capacity, and excess employment—had 
put a burden on all enterprises including SMEs. This paper examines the trends of the three 
excesses in SMEs. 
SME policies need to be reviewed both from the industrial policy and regional policy 
standpoints. Industrial clusters can also be grouped into four types according to how they 
were formed historically and according to their characteristics. This paper investigates the 
trends and characteristics of four types of industrial clusters. Although the number of 
establishments has declined in all types of industrial clusters, some clusters are trying to 
activate local economy by diversifying their businesses and converting to high value-added 
areas. 
SME policies in Japan have been modified to adjust to changing economic situations. The 
policy concept had already been changed from modernization to business conversion in the 
1980s. Moreover, business innovations and start-ups were encouraged in the 1990s. The 
Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law was revised fundamentally in 1999. The previous 
law defined companies with capital of less than 100 million yen (¥) or employing less than 
301 employees as SMEs. The revised law raised the capital size of SMEs from ¥100 million 
to ¥300 million. This paper is based on the definition of the previous law. 
The purpose of this paper is to come up with policy recommendations to support 
manufacturing SMEs based on the analysis of trends among SMEs. These 
recommendations are presented in the conclusion. 
2.  THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE SMES 
2.1  Subcontracting 
In Japan, a multi-tier subcontracting system based on specialization was established to help 
develop the supporting industry during the rapid economic growth period in the 1960s and 
1970s. The supporting industry is defined as the industry that supports assembly industries, 
such as electrical machinery and automobiles, by supplying parts and components, die, and 
mold. SMEs are main players in the supporting industry.
1 As the technology available to 
assemblers improved, so did that of SMEs in the supporting industry. An efficient division of 
labor between SMEs and LEs has been established in the electrical machinery and 
automobile industries. Subcontracting has contributed to the improvement of production 
efficiency in the Japanese manufacturing sector. Urata and Kawai (2001) credited the growth 
of total factor productivity (TFP) in the Japanese manufacturing sector between 1972 and 
1986 to active patent introduction and active participation in subcontracting. Although the 
multi-tier subcontracting system has been changing, the efficient division of labor between 
SMEs and LEs is still working. This system can be considered a factor in the improvement of 
the production efficiency and competitiveness of Japanese manufacturing. Typical 
subcontracting is observed in the electrical machinery and automobile industries. This paper 
                                                  
1 SMEs in the supporting industry belong to various categories of industrial classification, such as 
chemicals, non-metallic mineral products, basic metals, and metal products. 
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focuses on subcontracting in general machinery, electrical machinery, transportation 
equipment, and precision machinery. These industries accounted for 46% of the value 
added of the manufacturing sector in 2007. 
In Japan, major electrical machinery and automobile companies procure parts and 
components from three sources. First, they produce parts and components in their own 
factories using their own staff or resources. Second, they purchase parts and components 
from the market. The transactions with suppliers depend on market prices and are usually 
short term in nature. Third, they purchase parts and components from subcontractors based 
on long-term commitments. Economic theories try to explain why subcontracting is an 
efficient method of procurement for assemblers. Kimura (2001) summarized the theoretical 
foundation of subcontracting in terms of transaction cost, game theory, economics of 
information, and network approaches, and pointed out that technological characteristics are 
the key for an industry to develop a subcontracting system. LEs choose subcontracting when 
the upstream production requires specialized technology. This argument is based on the 
premise that efficient and reliable SMEs are available in Japan. 
Figure 1 shows the typical four-tier structure of subcontracting. In the top tier are the LEs, 
which include not only assemblers of electrical appliances and automobiles, but also 
manufacturers of complete components. Some automobile component manufacturers are 
multinational enterprises, and their capital size is larger than that of automobile assemblers.
2 
Large electrical machinery companies supply auto components to automobile assemblers. 
Transactions among LEs in the top tier are not subcontracting. LEs have factories 
assembling products in different areas. Clusters of SMEs specializing in specific products 
have been formed to supply the factories of the LEs. The rise and fall of these clusters 
depend on the condition of the factories that function as the core of the clusters. 
Figure 1: Structure of Subcontracting 
                        
F 
F i r s t     T  i  e  r 
L  E  s 
Second Tier
L  a  r  g  e     a  n  d     M  e  d  i  u  m    
FourthTier
T i n  y     a  n  d     S  m a l  l     E  n  t  e  r  p  r i s  e  s 
T h i  r  d     T i e  r 
S  m a l  l        a  n  d     M  e  d  i  u  m 
 
Source: Author. 
In the second tier are the medium and large enterprises that assemble components and 
supply them to LEs in the first tier. The enterprises in the second tier have three common 
abilities. First, they have specialized technology that others cannot imitate. Second, they can 
play the role of coordinator of SMEs. The enterprises in the second tier procure parts from 
SMEs in the third tier and assemble them. As they can control the quality and delivery of 
                                                  
2  The common stock of Denso (an automobile component manufacturer) was pegged at ¥187.4 
million on 31 March 2007 while Suzuki’s (an automobile assembler) was ¥120 million on the same 
day. 
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components and, therefore, can reduce total production costs, LEs benefit from this 
relationship by saving on overhead costs associated with controlling and coordinating SMEs. 
In the case of Toyota, while the company is indirectly linked with more than 30,000 
enterprises, it also has direct transactions with hundreds of enterprises. Third, they have 
design ability. It is common for LEs to give rough designs to the enterprises in the second 
tier, which then draw up the specifications. In many cases, enterprises in the first and 
second tiers co-develop components for new products (Yoshida 1997). 
Meanwhile, SMEs in the third tier specialize in specific processes and produce parts. They 
are also expected to meet demands on cost, quality, and delivery from their customers. Tiny 
and small enterprises in the fourth tier are mostly family owned and managed, and take 
charge of relatively simple processes at low margins. Due to their size, the management 
base of enterprises in the third and fourth tiers are generally weak. 
There is a significant gap between wages in LEs in the first tier and those of SMEs in the 
third and fourth tiers. In 2007, while the per capita annual value of total cash wages and 
salaries was ¥3 million in enterprises employing four to nine people, those of enterprises 
employing 1,000 or more persons was ¥6.7 million (Government of Japan, Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry 2009). LEs can save on labor costs by subcontracting. More 
important, however, is that subcontracting is dependent on specialization (e.g., in part and 
component production) in the electrical machinery and automobile industries. 
2.2  Relation-Specific Skills 
Subcontracting does not necessarily entail a rigid and exclusive contract. Electrical 
machinery and automobile companies produce many models and change models regularly. 
Specifications for each part of the new model as well as the price thereof are determined 
during the development period prior to the model change. Once a subcontractor receives an 
order for a part (when the commercial production of a new model is launched), the order is 
normally renewed or continued. There is a tendency for LEs to assign the responsibility for 
supplying a part for a specific model to a single subcontractor to avoid duplicate investment. 
But, when the life of a given model comes to an end, there is no guarantee that a 
subcontractor that has been supplying a part for that model will receive an order for the 
same kind of part for the new model. 
Subcontractors must meet the demands of a parent company at three critical points: (i) price 
reduction by some targeted percentage within a certain time span, reflecting efforts to 
reduce costs; (ii) high reliability in quality assurance; and (iii) high reliability in keeping up 
with the delivery schedule. On the other hand, parent companies support improvements in 
production efficiency by subcontractors through technical assistance, such as training 
subcontractors’ employees and dispatching engineers to subcontractors’ factories. 
Moreover, learning through repeated interactions with a particular parent company results in 
new skills being developed in addition to the basic technological capability that 
subcontractors accumulate. Asanuma (1989) referred to this accumulated learning as a 
relation-specific skill and noted that it usually leads to competitive spot bidding on the part of 
the subcontractors if the transaction is repeated often enough over a certain period.
3 
2.3  Changes in the Subcontracting System 
Japan’s subcontracting system has changed during the long-term recession that began in 
1991. Japanese automobile companies, including major complete component 
                                                  
3 Asanuma focused on the relations between typical LEs that manufacture the final products of the 
automobile and electrical machinery industries and the companies that supply repeatedly 
transacted parts. 
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manufacturers, have changed their procurement strategies in three ways and have reduced 
transactions with subcontractors. 
First, they began to procure components from subcontractors under different parent 
companies. Cross-group transactions became common in the Japanese market. Moreover, 
automobile companies gave up their strategy of producing all parts and components within 
the same company groups. They sold their non-earning subcontracting companies to other 
companies and concentrated on their high-performing sections. 
Second, automobile manufacturers reduced the number of components they use. During the 
economic boom in the second half of the 1980s, they increased the number of models and 
even included different components within the same model to attract customers through 
product distinction. Naturally, this raised the number of man-hours on the assembly line and 
the research and development (R&D) and production costs of components. During the 
recession, however, manufacturers tried to use common components for different models to 
reduce the number of components. Moreover, some companies formed tie-ups with different 
companies to share common components. As the reduction of items encouraged the 
standardization of components, lot production of items increased and component 
manufacturers started to benefit from economies of scale. Meanwhile, automobile 
assemblers concentrated on efficient component manufacturers.
4  Hence, inefficient 
manufacturers began to lose clients. 
Third, large automobile and component manufacturers increased the share of parts and 
components they produced in-house. They did this for several reasons. Reduced demand 
during the long-term recession made many laborers redundant and their capacity was 
underutilized. Thus, LEs that had been outsourcing the production of parts and components 
began to produce them in-house to use redundant laborers. Also, the standardization of 
components induced by the reduction of items made production of components in-house 
more profitable due to economies of scale. The development of microelectronics reduced the 
range of skills required—a definite advantage for the SMEs. Quality control and production 
management is easier to do in-house. As technology developments reduced the number of 
man-hours needed on the assembly lines in LEs, the space and labor needed to produce 
parts and components in-house became available (Yoshida 1997). 
A similar phenomenon can be observed in the electrical machinery industry.
5  The 
streamlining of procurement by the LEs led to the selection of only the most efficient 
subcontractors. LEs terminated transactions with inefficient subcontractors, possibly leading 
to the observed bipolarization among SMEs. 
The change in LE procurement policies made subcontracting between LEs and SMEs 
unstable. In some cases, parent companies made unfair demands of subcontractors, such 
as requiring them to reduce the prices of components after an agreement had been made. In 
other cases, contracts were terminated suddenly before the agreed upon date. 
2.4  Long-Term Downward Trends in Entry Rates 
The number of manufacturing establishments employing four to 299 people steadily declined 
from 434,754 in 1985 to 254,675 in 2007. The sharp decline in the number of establishments 
was caused not only by the abolishment of enterprises but also by the lower number of 
enterprises entering the economy. As shown in Figure 2, the entry rate has experienced a 
prolonged decline since the 1970s. The main factor behind this appears to be the trend in 
sole proprietorships, which account for a huge number of Japanese enterprises. This 
                                                  
4 In 1999, Nissan announced its procurement policy to reduce its parts and components suppliers 
from 1,145 to less than 600 before March 2002. 
5 In 2009, Sony announced its procurement policy to reduce its parts and components suppliers from 
2,500 to 1,200 before the end of 2010. 
4 
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phenomenon, however, should not be regarded entirely as a problem of sole proprietorships 
because they have the potential to grow and employ more people. The exit rate has been 
higher than the entry rate since 1989–1991. 
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Note: The entry rate indicates (1) the average number of establishments launched during a particular period as a 
proportion of (2) the number of establishments already in existence at the start of the period, and is calculated by 
dividing (1) by (2). The exit rate is calculated in a similar manner. 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (SMEA) (2007). 
The White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan (Small and Medium Enterprise 
Agency [SMEA] 2005) points out a long-term downward trend in the employer-to-employee 
income ratio in the manufacturing sector at the macro level (Figure 3). It regards the net 
operating profit of each establishment as employer income. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications’ Unincorporated Enterprise Survey has data on the manufacturing 
sector’s average net operating profit per establishment. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare’s Basic Survey on Wage Structure also has data on the sector’s average annual 
income of regular employees in establishments with more than nine regular personnel. The 
employer-to-employee income ratio is calculated by dividing the average annual income of 
regular employees by the average net operating profit per establishment. The income of 
employees has risen in absolute terms in enterprises of all sizes since 1974. This rise is 
more prominent than the rise in the absolute level of entrepreneurs' incomes. The downturn 
in entrepreneurs' incomes in the 1990s accelerated the decline of the employer-to-employee 
income ratio. The average annual net operating profit per establishment went down from 
¥5.2 million in 1993 to ¥3.1 million in 2006. 
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Note: The employer-to-employee income ratio is calculated by dividing the average annual income per regular 
employee by the average net operating profit per establishment. 
Sources: SMEA (2005); Government of Japan, Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure (available: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/index.html [accessed 19 November 2009]); 
Government of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau, FY 2008 
Unincorporated Enterprise Survey, Trend Survey (available: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/ 
ListE.do?lid=000001054597 [accessed 19 November 2009]). 
Genda and Kanbayashi (2002) analyzed the micro data and concluded that the probability of 
being self-employed decreased greatly among middle-aged workers in both urban and rural 
areas from 1989 to 1994. As labor-intensive processes shifted from metropolitan to rural 
areas, many LEs and SMEs set up factories during the 1980s. Employment opportunities in 
factories increased dramatically even in rural areas (Kato 2003). The relative decline in the 
incomes of self-employed workers appears to have reduced self-employment and decreased 
the entry rate of businesses into the economy. 
Moreover, the younger generation has lost interest in setting up enterprises or joining family 
businesses as they have a better chance of getting a high, stable salary elsewhere. The 
opportunity cost of setting up a business varies according to each individual and time period. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the peak of the age-wage curve for SMEs was people in 
their thirties. Many SME entrepreneurs set up their own factories at this age because of their 
meager salaries as employees (SMEA 1979). For many employees who did not have a high 
level of education, starting their own businesses was the better option as it was difficult for 
them to get a job with a high, stable salary. Setting up their own businesses was a chance to 
improve their incomes while using their skills. Today, this generation has reached retirement 
age, but many are still running their businesses due to the absence of successors. In 2007, 
for instance, 47% of self-employed workers in the Japanese manufacturing sector were at 
least 60 years old (Figure 4). Many SMEs have already shut down their establishments and 
more are likely to follow owing to the lack of successors to the top position. 
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Figure 4: Structure of Self-Employed Workers in Japanese Manufacturing,  






















































































































































Source: Government of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2007 Employment Status Survey 
(available: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/estat/html/NewList/000001017285/NewList-000001017285.html [accessed 19 
November 2009]). 
Advanced machinery is necessary to meet the rising demands of customers. SMEs cannot 
maintain their businesses without advanced technology and accumulated skills. Thus, entry 
into manufacturing, particularly for the younger generation, has become more difficult—and 
costly—than it was during the 1960s. In addition, Japanese SMEs are facing stiff competition 
from importers of cheap goods from overseas.  
3.  IMPACTS OF LONG-TERM RECESSION 
The Japanese economy has been facing long-term recession with deflation since 1991. 
Although gross domestic product growth rates recovered slightly in the mid-1990s, they 
became negative in 1998 and 1999 (Figure 5). Nonperforming assets became a serious 
problem in those years and SMEs faced financial difficulties due to the non-availability of 
bank loans. The shrinking domestic market affected the performance of the manufacturing 
sector and enterprises were burdened by the so-called “three excesses,” namely, excess 
debt, excess capacity, and excess employment. 
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Source: Government of Japan, Cabinet Office web site (available: 
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/qe093/gdemenuea.html [accessed 19 November 2009]). 
Figure 6 shows the interest-bearing debt redemption trend among SMEs and LEs between 
1986 and 2007. The period is estimated by dividing outstanding interest-bearing debt at the 
end of each quarter by annual cash flow. Outstanding interest-bearing debt consists of short-
term borrowing, long-term borrowing, and corporate bonds. Cash flow is calculated by 
adding half of the annual ordinary profit and depreciation expenses. The debt redemption 
periods for LEs and SMEs were 5.7 and 6.2 years at the end of the first quarter of 1986. 
During the economic boom, the gap between SMEs and LEs was smaller. While recession 
decreased ordinary profit, long-term debt rose continuously and the debt redemption period 
went up rapidly in the second half of 1993. Banks did not want to restrict themselves from 
extending loans to SMEs simply because they were afraid that their loans would become 
nonperforming assets. As a result, banks increased long-term loans to SMEs between 1990 
and 1995 in spite of the recession. However, additional loans to avoid financial crunch made 
excess debt in SMEs more serious. As long-term debt decreased in 2001, financial strength 
started to improve in 2003. But this does not mean that the financial conditions of all SMEs 
improved. Some SME went bankrupt with the accumulation of debt and ultimately 
disappeared from the market. 
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LE = large enterprise, SME = small or medium enterprise. 
Notes:  
1. The Database of Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry covers companies with more than  
¥1 million capital, thus, tiny SMEs are excluded from this data. 
2. Interest-bearing debt repayment period = outstanding interest-bearing debt / cash flow. 
3. Outstanding interest-bearing debt = short-term borrowing + long-term borrowing + corporate bonds. 
4. Cash flow = ordinary profit x 0.5 + depreciation expenses. 
5. The moving average for the past four quarters is used for the interest-bearing debt repayment period. 
Source: Government of Japan, Ministry of Finance, Database of Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by 
Industry (available: http://www.fabnet2.mof.go.jp/nfbsys/Nennhou_oy.htm [accessed 10 February 2009]). 
The value added of SMEs employing 4–299 people (based on 2000 price index) started to 
decline in 1991, but recovered and reached its peak in 1997. The year 1997 was a turning 
point. Table 1 suggests that small establishments have declined. The number of 
establishments employing 4–29 people decreased by 1.5% per annum between 1985 and 
1997. The downward trend accelerated after 1997. During the recession period, many 
establishments closed down. The number of smaller establishments decreased faster and 
the number of establishments owned by LEs also went down. Although many factors caused 
the decline in the number of SMEs, the long-term recession is still the main reason. Excess 
debt had a significant effect on SMEs during the recession and forced many SMEs to exit 
the market. As expected, employment in SMEs with 4–299 employees also decreased by 
1.2% per annum between 1985 and 1997. The decline became sharp after 1997. Because 
SMEs accounted for a large share of manufacturing establishments, employment in this 
sector went down significantly after 1997. The exit of some SMEs might have led to a 
reduction of excess capacity and excess employment in SMEs. Conversely, labor 
productivity has grown in all sizes of establishments in spite of negative or negligible growth 
between 1997 and 2007. The exit of inefficient companies might have actually improved 
labor productivity. 
9 
 ADBI Working Paper 169    Uchikawa 
 
Table 1: Trends of Manufacturing Establishments Employing  










Value Added  





















4–29 -1.5  -4.3  -1.2  -3.6  2.5  -2.8  2.5  0.8 
30–99 -0.3*  -2.4  -0.2*  -2.2  3.8  -1.6  3.8  0.6 
100–299  0.2*  -0.7  0.3*  -0.6 4.6 0.5 4.6 1.1 
300 and above  0* -0.6*  -0.3* -1.2  3.5  0  3.5  1.2 
All -1.3  -3.9  -0.5*  -2.0  3.6  -0.6  3.6  1.4 
Notes:  
* Statistically insignificant at 95% confidence level. 
**Value added is deflated by corporate goods price index of 2000 base (average index for domestic corporate goods, 
exports and imports) for manufacturing industry products. 
Source: Government of Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Census of Manufacturers (available: 
http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/kougyo/archives/index.html [accessed 19 November 2009])., 
To examine the effects of excess capacity and excess employment, TFP in the general 
machinery, electrical machinery, transportation equipment, and precision machinery 
industries was calculated for four categories according to number of employees: 30–99, 
100–299, 300–999, and more than 999. This paper adopts the growth accounting approach 
based on two-input frameworks, taking single deflated value added as output, and labor and 
capital as inputs. The Translog index of TFP growth is arrived at by using the following 
equation: 
 
SL(t)+SL(t－1)                 SK(t)+SK(t－1) 
ΔlnTFP(t)= ΔlnY(t)－[ ×ΔlnL(t)]－[                      ×ΔlnK(t)]  (1) 
  2                                       2 
 
In the above equation, Y denotes value added, L denotes labor, and K denotes capital. Δln 
Y(t) = ln Y(t) – ln Y(t-1). In the same way, Δln L(t), and Δln K(t) are defined. SL is the income 
share of labor, and SK is the income share of capital. SL and SK add up to one. Using the 
above equation, the growth rates of TFP are computed for each year.  
The basic source of data used for the productivity estimates is the Census of Manufacturers. 
To make price corrections on the reported data on value added, suitable deflators were 
selected from the corporate goods price index. Capital input series were created, allotting 
data from the Annual Report on Gross Capital Stock of Private Enterprises (Government of 
Japan, Cabinet Office 2009) into four size groups. The estimates are shown in Figures 7a–
7d. TFP growth rates express different trends, depending on employment size in the 
transportation equipment and precision machinery industries.  
10 
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Figure 7a: Trends of TFP Growth in the General Machinery Industry 
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Figure 7c: Trends of TFP Growth in the Transportation Equipment Industry 
 
 
Figure 7d: Trends of TFP Growth in the Precision Machinery Industry 
 
Note: The moving average for three years is used. 
Source: Author. 
Trends of excess debt and excess capacity may affect TFP growth rates in the four 
industries. A multiple regression analysis was used to study these effects on TFP growth 
rates. The analysis was based on pooled cross-section and time-series data. The regression 
equation is specified as:  
 
TFPGit = α+β1ESTit +β2 RED+β3URit + u (2) 
 
12 
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In this equation, TFPGit is the growth rate of TFP in industry i in year t; ESTit is the rate of 
change in the number of establishments in industry i in year t; RED is the rate of change in 
the interest-bearing debt redemption period in industry i in year t; and UR it is the rate of 
change in the utilization rates of capacity in industry i in year t. The regression equation is 
estimated by the fixed-effects model with the year dummy (to identify a dramatic change in a 
specific year) and without it. 
The Ministry of Finance’s Database of Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by 
Industry categorizes companies into four groups according to capital size: ¥10–50 million, 
¥50–100 million, ¥100 million–¥1 billion, and more than ¥1 billion. As the classification of 
Census of Manufacturers depends on the number of regular employees, conversion is 
necessary to use the data from both sources. This paper assumes that enterprises with a 
capital of ¥10–50 million employ 30–99 people, enterprises with a capital of ¥50–100 million 
employ 100–299 people, enterprises with a capital of ¥100 million–¥1 billion employ 300–
999 people, and enterprises with a capital of more than ¥1 billion employ more than 999 
people. The Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan has created a table 
differentiating enterprises by industry, number of regular employees, and amount of capital. 
Table 2 shows the percentage of enterprises that meet the above-mentioned capital size 
conditions for each employment size category. Although enterprises with a capital of ¥50–
100 million and ¥100 million–¥1 billion constitute a relatively small share of those employing 
100–299 and 300–999 employees, respectively, enterprises with a capital of ¥10–50 million 
and more than ¥1 billion account for more than 70% of enterprises employing 30–99 and 
1,000 or more employees, respectively. 
Table 2: Percentage of Enterprises That Meet Both Conditions on Employment Size 
and Capital Size in Total Number of Enterprises in 1999 
(%) 










30–99 75.5  70.1  75.4  75.9 
100–299 31.2  24.6  28.3  32.6 
300–999 38.2  45.3  50.2  40.8 
1,000 or more  86.8  76.7  82.9  73.5 
Note: The assumption of conversion is based on the following:  
Enterprises with capital of ¥10–50 million employ 30–99 people. 
Enterprises with capital of ¥50–100 million employ 100–299 people. 
Enterprises with capital of ¥100 million–¥1, billion employ 299–999 people. 
Enterprises with capital of more than ¥1 billion employ more than 999 people. 
Source: Government of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 1999 Establishment and Enterprise 
Census (available: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/ListE.do?bid=000000290031&cycode=0 [accessed 19 
November 2009]). 
While the TFP estimates were based on the assumption of full utilization of capacity, the 
TFP growth rates might depend on underutilization of capacity due to the recession. This 
study estimates utilization rates on the basis of minimum capital output ratio (Sastry 1984). 
Capital output ratios are calculated. A benchmark year is then selected on the basis of the 
observed lowest capital output ratio. It is considered as capacity output. The estimate of 
capacity is obtained by dividing real capital stock by the minimum capital output ratio. The 
utilization rate is given by actual output as a proportion of the estimated capacity. 
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where U is capacity utilization, O is gross value added, and C is the estimated capacity. This 
estimation is crude but there are no better estimates of capacity utilization (Goldar and 
Kumari 2003). 
The regression results presented in Table 3 show a significant and negative correlation 
between TFP growth rates and the rate of change in the number of enterprises in both LEs 
and SMEs. It suggests that the decrease in the number of establishments might improve 
TFP growth rates. It can be interpreted that the exit of inefficient SMEs might have raised 
TFP growth rates. A significant and positive correlation between TFP growth rates and 
capacity utilization can be seen in both LEs and SMEs. Utilization rates might have affected 
TFP growth rates. A correlation between TFP growth rates and a change in the interest-
bearing debt redemption period was not observed. Although some SMEs could afford to pay 
back their debt, they did not have enough funds to invest in machinery or the improvement of 
production methods. Low investment in these areas might undermine the SMEs’ 
competitiveness in the long term. 
Table 3: Determinants of Productivity Growth 
(Dependent Variable: TFP Growth Rate) 
Item 
Without Year Dummy With Year Dummy 
Large SME Large SME 
Utilization  Rates  0.924* 0.861* 0.941* 0.870* 
  (64.118) (39.748) (66.164) (42.139) 
Number of 
Establishments 
-0.342* -0.096** -0.375* -0.217* 
(-13.833) (-2.231) (-14.829) (-4.830) 
Debt Redemption 
Period 
4.57E-05  0.002 -0.002 0.000 
(0.006) (0.744) (-0.196) (0.126) 
Constant  Term  0.437* 0.252* 0.454* 0.365* 
  (18.014) (6.152) (19.619) (9.365) 
Adjusted R
2  0.968 0.927 0.977 0.968 
No. of Observations  176  176  176  176 
R
2= coefficient of determination. 
Notes: 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
Source: Author. 
During the long-term recession, streamlining of procurement by LEs changed the multi-tier 
subcontracting system. LEs reduced the number of suppliers and components they used. 
While efficient SMEs selected by LEs were able to expand their business, inefficient SMEs 
lost customers. Excess debt forced many SMEs to exit the market. The exit of inefficient 
SMEs reduced excess employment and excess capacity and might have raised TFP growth 
rates. On the other hand, efficient SMEs improved their competitiveness through 
investments in machinery and improvement of production methods. It is expected that if 
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worldwide recession permanently shrinks demand in the four industries, more SMEs will be 
forced into closing down. 
4.  REGIONAL VARIATION OF INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS 
SME policies need to be reviewed from both the industrial policy and regional policy 
standpoints for three reasons. First, when an assembly factory is closed down, although the 
impact on the industry as a whole is limited, the impact on the region is huge. As many 
SMEs that had been supplying the closed factories lose customers, the industrial cluster 
where the closed factories are located is affected. Second, the leading industry in a cluster 
may change. When a leading industry starts to decline, municipal governments must 
promote other industries. Third, exchange and tie–ups among SMEs in different industries 
help to develop the local economy. In fact, the focus of SME policy has shifted from industry 
to cluster. The collaboration between SMEs in different industries was emphasized in the 
1980s. 
Industrial clusters can be categorized into four types according to how they were formed 
historically and according to their characteristics: (i) company town clusters, (ii) production 
region clusters, (iii) mixed urban clusters, and (iv) mixed invitation clusters (SMEA 2006). 
The advantages of the business environment differ according to the type of cluster and have 
changed in the process of industrialization. 
Company town clusters are formed by the agglomeration of numerous subcontractor groups 
around the assembly factory of a particular LE. Typical examples are the region around 
Toyota City, which has Toyota Motor Corporation at its heart, and Hitachi City, which has 
Hitachi at its heart. Cluster regions have developed as a result of enterprises cutting the cost 
of expensive tasks such as production management and the acquisition of new customers, 
and their move to specialize in certain production processes. SMEs benefit from being within 
the same business groups as the LEs. The success of Toyota Motor Corporation raised the 
number of employees living in Toyota City, as well as the value added (at 2000 prices) by 
1.5% and 0.6% between 1997 and 2007, respectively (Table 4). On the other hand, although 
the number of employees in Hitachi City was more than 40,000 before 1994, it came down to 
25,000 in 2005. In the 1990s, Hitachi shifted the manufacturing base of its home appliances 
abroad. As a result, the number of employees at its major subcontractors was reduced to 
half the size it was in the 1970s (Japan Small Business Research Institute 2003). As clusters 
are affected by the difficulties experienced by LEs, SMEs are forced to diversify their 
businesses. The traditional business model of being dependent on certain LEs and doing 
business within the cluster is not functioning as well as it used to. Within the clusters, SMEs 
are discovering new clients and trying to diversify outlets. 
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Table 4: Trends of Manufacturing Establishments Employing More Than Three 






















Toyota -0.5*  -0.2*  0.4*  1.5  -0.6*  0.6 
Hitachi -2.5  -3.6  -1.1  -3.5  2.2*  0.3* 
Production Region 
Tsubame -1.6  -3.7  -1.3  -3.1  2.3  0.2* 
Sabae  -0.7*  -5.0   -1.0   -3.4  1.7  -3.5 
Mixed Urban 
Sumida -3.7  -6.2  -3.5  -5.3  0.4*  4.9* 
Ota  -3.5 -4.2* -4.1  -5.9  -0.5*  -4.6 
Higashi-Osaka  -1.5 -3.7 -1.4  -3.4  1.1*  -2.7 
Mixed Invitation 
Kitakami  1.5 -2.1 2.9  -1.1  4.6  2.9* 
Kofu  -3.8 -4.8* -1.7  -2.7*    2.6  -0.4* 
Note: * Statistically insignificant at 95% confidence level. 
Source: Government of Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Census of Manufacturers (available: 
http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/kougyo/archives/index.html [accessed 1 June 2009]). 
Production region clusters are formed by enterprises belonging to a specific industry, such 
as consumer goods, concentrating in a particular region that has grown through the sharing 
of raw materials and technologies that accumulated in that region. Typical examples are the 
Tsubame-Sanjyo region in Niigata Prefecture, where cutlery and blade manufacturers have 
clustered, and Sabae City in Fukui Prefecture, where eyeglass frame manufacturers have 
clustered. SMEs in these regions receive orders through a joint order-taking system and 
have established a system of division of labor within the cluster to manufacture cheap, high-
quality, mass-produced goods. However, tough competition with cheap goods produced in 
the People’s Republic of China has shrunk their domestic and export markets. Their system 
of mass production, which has been a source of competitive advantage, appears to be 
performing less well today. Heavy dependence on certain industries and the highly 
segmented and specialized production processes prevent the clusters from adjusting to the 
new business environment (SMEA 2006). The number of establishments and employees 
has clearly declined since 1997 in Tsubame and Sabae. In Sabae City, some SMEs are 
trying to enter the precision machinery and medical equipment industries utilizing 
accumulated skills. 
Mixed urban clusters have formed in urban areas. There are many such clusters in the 
machinery and metalworking industries, and there often occurs a division of labor between 
enterprises in the same cluster, as well as business relations that cut across traditional 
industry groupings. Typical examples include Sumida City and Ota City in Tokyo Prefecture 
and Higashi-Osaka City in Osaka Prefecture. The number of establishments in Sumida and 
Ota decreased sharply even before the boom period began in 1985. Rising land prices 
encouraged the diversion of factory sites to housing areas. Recession accelerated the 
downward trends in the three cities between 1997 and 2007. But, some SMEs are growing. 
As it is difficult to establish systems of mass production in urban areas, where the cost of 
land and labor is relatively high, clusters located in urban areas specialize in high value-
added products. Production functions in such clusters are based on flexible divisions of labor 
as a result of the clustering of diverse industries and technologies. Consequently, the 
clusters have been able to respond to changes in the industrial structure during the long-
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term recession. It is noteworthy that SMEs in these clusters have the production and 
processing abilities to deal with product development and trials. 
Mixed invitation clusters are formed as a result of local government efforts to attract 
enterprises and the implementation of industrial relocation plans. During the 1970s, the 
government regulated the size of factory sites in metropolitan areas and subsidized the 
transfer of factory sites to rural areas. As many of the invited SMEs belong to industry 
groups outside the cluster, collaboration within the clusters has not been very active. Typical 
examples are the Kitakamigawa basin region in Iwate Prefecture and Kofu City in 
Yamanashi Prefecture. The clusters have developed because of the increasing number of 
labor-intensive plants, enticed by large orders from enterprises in that region and the 
comparatively cheap labor. Some SMEs in mixed urban clusters set up secondary factories 
in mixed invitation clusters due to regulations pertaining to factory sites. Various SMEs have 
been added to these clusters such that they have become more complex and are no longer 
dependent on a specific industry. However, some factories have withdrawn from the clusters 
due to the availability of cheaper labor in other Asian countries. The number of 
establishments decreased in Kofu City and Kitakawa City during the 1990s. This shows that 
with globalization, cheap labor is fading as a competitive edge for clusters in Japan. 
The above analysis suggests that diversification and collaboration that cut across traditional 
industry groupings are key points to activating the local economy. Although the decline in the 
number of SMEs has been a common phenomenon in the four types of clusters, some 
clusters are still creating new businesses by taking advantage of more flexible divisions of 
labor. 
5.  SME POLICIES IN JAPAN 
SME policies in Japan have been modified to adjust to changing economic conditions. SME 
policies during the 1980s were noteworthy for three reasons. First, they tried to encourage 
R&D in SMEs, rather than the diffusion of existing technology. SMEs could get low-interest 
loans from government financial institutions after local governments approved their 
technology development plans in high-technology areas such as electronics and 
biotechnology. Subsidies and tax concessions were provided for R&D activities conducted 
by SMEs. Second, the government recognized the positive effects of technology exchange 
and tie-ups among SMEs in different industries and began to encourage these activities. 
During the recession in the 1970s, SMEs in the machinery industry collaborated to produce 
high value-added products. The collaboration was effective for the joint development of unit 
components. Thus, in 1981, the government started technology exchange plaza projects to 
facilitate exchange and tie-ups among SMEs in each prefecture. In 1988, the government 
began to subsidize and give tax concessions to new technology developments by 
cooperative associations among SMEs in different industries. Third, the government 
encouraged new project ideas. Prefectural and municipal governments and the private 
sector got together and set up business incubators to reactivate local economies negatively 
affected by the recession. Subsidies from the government and low-interest loans from 
government financial institutions were provided to incubator projects. However, the 
occupation ratio of incubator projects was low due to the high rents. Such high rents were 
charged because prefectural and municipal governments gave priority to the acquisition of 
subsidies from the central government over careful examination of the feasibility of projects 
(Kurose 2006). 
The Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law was revised fundamentally in 1999. It was 
considered the backbone of SME policies. Its policy concept was to rectify the gap between 
SMEs and LEs in terms of labor productivity by upgrading the structure of SMEs and 
improving the conditions of trade. The government also recognized that SMEs could not 
introduce modern technology given their small size and the excessive competition among 
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them. The policy concept had already been changed from modernization to business 
conversion in the 1980s. Moreover, business innovations and start-ups were encouraged in 
the 1990s. 
Amendment of the law confirmed the change in SME polices. The new Small and Medium 
Enterprise Basic Law was based on a new philosophy of promoting diverse and vigorous 
growth and the development of independent SMEs rather than on rectifying gaps. It has 
three key goals: (i) promoting business innovation and new business start-ups, (ii) 
strengthening the management base of SMEs, and (iii) facilitating adaptation to economic 
and social changes. Business innovation is a broad concept and covers new products that 
SMEs are trying to develop and produce. The new law does not have any intent to direct 
SMEs in specific areas, as was the case with the old law. SME policies became competition-
oriented. Moreover, the new law defined the responsibility of municipal governments. Before 
the amendment, only the central and prefectural governments were involved in SME 
promotion. 
However, SME policies cannot stop the long trend of SME decline during the recession. The 
exit of many SMEs has significantly affected local economies. Some municipal governments 
have implemented local ordinances promoting SME development to activate their local 
economies. Municipal governments can play an important role in collecting information, 
interacting with SMEs, and organizing exchange among SMEs. 
In 1979, Sumida City became the first municipality in which the government implemented a 
local ordinance on SME development. The SME promotion policies of Sumida City are 
unique for three reasons. First, the government set up a database containing pertinent 
information about SMEs in the city. In 1977 and 1978, 180 employees of the city office 
visited all 9,313 registered establishments to conduct a survey. They also carried out a 
hearing with personnel of the SMEs. The hearing was a good opportunity for employees of 
the city office to understand the problems that SMEs were facing. The experience was useful 
in the development of a master plan for SME promotion in 1986, 1989, and 2003. Second, 
SME owners were given the opportunity to participate in policymaking. In 1980, the 
government set up the Industrial Promotion Committee, which consisted of SME owners, 
experts, and government employees. In consultation with the said committee, the 
government runs an SME center that has technical advisers and is equipped with expensive 
machine tools and instruments that SMEs in the city can use. Third, SME promotion was 
strengthened by linking it to local tourism. The Industrial Promotion Committee 
recommended the setting up of small museums to present the industry and culture of 
Sumida City to local and foreign tourists, as well as small shops on the premises of the 
factories to sell products made by Sumida City SMEs. SME promotion thus became a part of 
policies to activate the local economy. 
The direction of SME policies can be appreciated on three fronts. First, private sector 
initiatives are being facilitated. The government should not force business models like 
modernization policies. SMEs have the ability to find new business areas. Second, R&D 
activities are being encouraged. SMEs have a competitive advantage in R&D activities 
because they can specialize in niche areas. Third, municipal governments can play an 
important role in promoting SMEs. Some municipal governments have followed the best 
practice of Sumida City. Based on the experience of Sumida City, they have learned to give 
priority to SME promotion, tap local resources, and take into consideration the character of 
the local economy when making their plans. They likewise have realized the importance of 
the interaction between the local governments and SMEs in making their plans work. 
6.  RESULTS OF FIELD SURVEY 
To investigate diversification by SMEs and its policy implications, a survey was conducted in 
Ota City of Tokyo Prefecture and in Southern Kyoto Prefecture in May, June, and November 
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of 2004. The target SMEs were selected mainly from the award-winning SMEs in Ota City 
and Kyoto Prefecture. Most of them were above-average SMEs in terms of standard 
qualities and had unique traits. Table 5 shows the characteristics of each company. Those in 
Ota City had flexible divisions of labor as mentioned earlier. Although the government of Ota 
City enacted local ordinances that affect SME development and has been actively promoting 
SME development, the number of SMEs has declined since the 1980s. After the factory sites 
in metropolitan areas were regulated, some SMEs established their secondary factories for 
mass production in rural areas. As Southern Kyoto is close to Osaka, subcontracting SMEs 
have developed in the area. SMEs in Japan are becoming less competitive in labor-intensive 
processes as a result of competition from neighboring Asian countries. SMEs that are doing 
well in urban areas might have lessons to offer. Five points were found out from the survey.  
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Table 5: Characteristics of Surveyed SMEs 
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Supplier  Molding    Ota City    
Precise process  100  Electronics, 
Semiconductor  Own factory 
Member of Tokyo 
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Electrical 
equipment  9 Power  plant 




 Subcontractor   PRC 
(planning)    





         
Metal process  8  Semiconductor 
Industrial 
apartment 
owned by Ota 
City 









owned by Ota 
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new products   Rural  area  Original 
products 
Metal process  18  Electrical 
equipment  Own factory    Process of 
trial       
Metal process  45  Semiconductor  Own factory    Supplier         
Electrical 







owned by Ota 
City 
   Development of 
new products    Original 
products 
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Customers  Location  Participation in 
Cooperation 
Relation to 






Precise process  20  Machine tool,  
Semiconductor  Own factory  Cooperative 
association  Subcontractor      
Metal process  46  Transportation 
equipment  Own factory    Subcontractor Heat treatment    Rural area   
Machine 
manufacturing  92 Automobile Own  factory   Supplier  Development of 
new products  Thailand     Original 
products 
Precise die and 
press  120  Electrical 
equipment  Own factory  Joint R&D with 





Rural area  Original 
products 
Metal process  8  Semiconductor 
Industrial 
apartment 
owned by Ota 
City 
  Supplier       
Plating  12    Own  factory           
Machine 
manufacturing  11  Electrical 
equipment  Own  factory    Supplier       
Machine 
manufacturing  37  Electrical 












Customers  Location  Participation in 
Cooperation 
Relation to 






Precise die and 




Own factory  Exchange association 
among SMEs  Supplier  Production of 
machinery   Rural  area   
Machine tool 
Manufacturing  48   Own  factory   Supplier    PRC    Original 
products 
Precise plastic 
mould  42  Electrical 
equipment  Own factory  Exchange association 
among SMEs  Supplier                 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
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First, most of the 20 SMEs had outstanding technology and special skills, and had 
established their brands among their clients. With the high price of land and high wages that 
put SMEs in urban areas at a disadvantage, they must have unique sales points. Five SMEs 
developed original products that other companies, including LEs, were not producing and 
were selling them. Other SMEs also had special skills that other companies could not imitate 
easily. For example, although a metal processing SME has higher margin rates than other 
companies because it can only process difficult-to-cut materials in the short term, it can get 
orders regularly. Originality, unique technology, and skill are more important than production 
costs for SMEs in urban areas. 
Second, three of the 20 SMEs were R&D-oriented business ventures that concentrate on the 
design and development of new products. The first SME produced equipment for 
mechanization. It had obtained patents from Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, and United 
States. The managing director pointed out the possibility of a development-oriented venture 
business. As LEs reduced the number of engineers on staff during the recession, they must 
rely on outsourcing to develop peripheral equipment. The second SME also mentioned the 
same point. Because small venture companies look for niche markets, they have many 
opportunities to develop various products. Although experience is necessary for the 
development of new products, engineers in LEs do not often get many chances to expand 
their expertise because they concentrate only on major projects. Meanwhile, SMEs 
concentrate on product design, development, and sales, but outsource manufacturing. The 
third SME is shifting to become an engineering company so it is likely that it will stop 
manufacturing in the future. 
Third, four of the 17 SMEs in Ota City were located in industrial apartments. They had 
factories on the lower floors and residences on the higher floors. It is noteworthy that two 
R&D-oriented business ventures were in such industrial apartments. It can be surmised that 
industrial apartments helped some new industry-oriented SMEs to enter the market. 
Fourth, five of the 20 SMEs had secondary factories in rural areas. Secondary factories take 
charge of mass production, while head factories concentrate on small-amount production of 
many varieties of products related to R&D and trials. 
Fifth, four of the 20 SMEs were subcontractors. Among them, three SMEs had transactions 
with other companies while only one completely depended on a parent company. That 
company is eventually going to move its operations to the People’s Republic of China to 
follow its parent company. This shows that dependence on a parent company makes the 
management base of an SME fairly weak. 
The above analysis suggests three ways through which SMEs can survive in urban areas. 
First, SMEs that have outstanding technology and special skills can survive. Although SMEs 
in urban areas do not have an advantage in mass production, they have the edge in small-
amount production of many varieties of products. As LEs in metropolitan areas actively 
conduct R&D, SMEs have a chance to be involved in trials and R&D-related business. 
Second, R&D-oriented business ventures have the opportunity to grow in niche areas. As 
manufacturing is outsourced, efficient links between the R&D efforts of SMEs in urban areas 
and manufacturing spots is important. Third, setting up industrial apartments is an effective 
way to relax constraints for new industry-oriented SMEs looking to set up factory sites in 
urban areas. 
7.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
During the long-term recession, the streamlining of procurement by LEs changed the multi-
tier subcontracting system. LEs reduced the number of suppliers and components they 
used. While efficient SMEs selected by LEs were able to expand their business, inefficient 
SMEs lost customers. The regression results show a significant and negative correlation 
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between TFP growth rates and the rate of change in the number of enterprises in four 
industries: general machinery, electrical machinery, transportation equipment, and precision 
machinery. This suggests that a decrease in the number of establishments might improve 
TFP growth rates. It can be interpreted that the exit of inefficient SMEs might have raised 
TFP growth rates. Only efficient SMEs that meet the demands of cost, quality, and delivery 
from LEs will survive during the present recession. It is expected that if worldwide recession 
permanently shrinks demand in the four industries, more SMEs will be forced into closing 
down. 
Although the decline in the number of SMEs has been a common phenomenon in the four 
types of clusters, some SMEs have still been able to create new businesses by taking 
advantage of more flexible divisions of labor. The traditional business model of being 
dependent on certain LEs and doing business within the cluster is not functioning as well as 
it used to. Heavy dependence on certain industries and highly segmented and specialized 
production processes prevent the clusters from adjusting to the new business environment. 
SME policies must encourage diversification and collaboration that cut across traditional 
industry groupings to form flexible divisions of labor. 
SMEs in Japan are becoming less competitive in labor-intensive processes, as a result of 
stiff competition from neighboring Asian countries. SMEs that are doing well in urban areas 
might have some lessons to offer. Results of a field survey suggest three ways in which 
SMEs can survive in urban areas. First, SMEs that have outstanding technology and special 
skills can survive. Although SMEs in urban areas do not have the edge in mass production, 
they do have an advantage in small-amount production for many products. Second, R&D-
oriented business ventures have a chance to grow in niche areas. As manufacturing is 
outsourced, efficient links between the R&D efforts of SMEs in urban areas and 
manufacturing spots is important. Third, setting up industrial apartments is an effective way 
to relax constraints for new industry-oriented SMEs looking to set up factory sites in urban 
areas. 
The following policy recommendations are based on this analysis: 
•  Unfair trade should be regulated by law. In some cases, parent companies have 
made unfair demands of subcontractors, such as demanding that they reduce the 
prices of components after an agreement had been signed. In other cases, 
contracts have been abruptly terminated. Such unfair treatment might affect SMEs. 
•  Although the financing of working capital for SMEs has been secured, careful 
examination of additional financing is necessary. Although the recession 
decreased ordinary profits, banks increased long-term loans to SMEs between 
1991 and 1995 because they were afraid that these loans would become 
nonperforming assets. Additional loans to avoid financial crunch made excess debt 
in SMEs more serious. 
•  The entry of SMEs should be encouraged by providing incentives such as 
subsidies, low-interest loans, tax concessions, and incubator facilities as these can 
contribute to employment creation and the opening of new industries. The costs of 
entering the market have risen due to technological development in the past years. 
Advanced machinery is necessary to meet the increasing demands of customers. 
SMEs cannot maintain their businesses without advanced technology and 
accumulated skills. Entry into manufacturing, particularly by the young generation, 
is thus becoming more difficult than it was during the 1960s. On the other hand, 
R&D-oriented business ventures have a chance to grow in niche areas. Such entry 
should be supported by policies. 
•  Municipal governments should play an active role in coordinating collaboration that 
cuts across traditional industry groupings. Based on the experience of Sumida City, 
municipal governments have learned to give priority to SME promotion, tap local 
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resources, and take into consideration the character of the local economy when 
making their plans. They likewise realized the importance of the interaction 
between local governments and SMEs to make their plans work. 
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